prices brought about by informed trading may benefit other investors' welfare, if aggregate investment choices are sufficiently flexible at the interim stage. Thus, for example, the average level of risky interim investment is higher with than without insider trading in Leland (1992) . This is due to the lower conditional variance of future asset returns in a noisy REE with insider trading, which leads rational outsiders to augment their demand schedules for the risky investment.
3 Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) and recently Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) have pointed out that interim share prices which reflect a greater degree of otherwise unverifiable payoff-relevant information may also be useful to construct more precise performance measures for motivating effort by risk-averse managers. In this paper, we deemphasize these interim productive effects, and assume instead inflexible ex ante aggregate investment portfolio choices by the firm's investors. Our choice is justified in environments in which the time lag between the accrual of insider information and subsequent public knowledge thereof, for example for accounting earnings or tender offers, is short and/or the nature of such interim information allows its costless and verifiable disclosure ex post. At a more basic level, we wish to argue that future-payoff-relevant insider information that might be useful for the interim collective choices of a firm need not be reflected in its interim share price via insider trading in order to impact on the firm's choices. Insiders who receive such information would use it in making appropriate choices for the firm, as long as they are otherwise suitably rewarded via ex post bonuses etc. to reflect the firm's owners' welfare. Hence, any analysis of the impact of insider trading on the welfare of the outside shareholders of a firm should not assign a prominent role to its effect on the firm's interim choices.
In our model interim asset prices are influenced by the stochastic proportion of outsiders who sell and can be further modified by the presence of insider trading. The interim consumption and portfolio allocations of non-insiders are clearly affected by a greater informativeness of asset prices brought about by informed insider trading. The insider, in turn, is a strategic player and takes the others agents' selling and optimal portfolio choices into account in deciding on her trading strategy, given her private information regarding future asset returns at the interim stage. We study the resulting equilibrium impact of insider trading on the information contained in the long-term asset price regarding its future return, and on the outsiders' ex ante expected utilities. In the process we characterize the ex ante investment choices and the interim and ex post consumption levels of the early-and late-dier outsiders.
We compare agents' optimal choices, given aggregate resource constraints and/or budget constraints at equilibrium prices, as well as their welfare levels across three scenarios:
(A) choices by a welfare-maximising planner; (B) interim trading among outsider agents only;
and (C) interim trading with possible participation by the insider. These comparisons are carried out numerically, for reasons of tractability in the face of possibly binding interim liquidity constraints or "corner solutions", which in turn affect the agents' ex ante optimal choices. We find that outsiders' welfare is always the highest in scenario (A), which is not surprising since our planner is endowed with more interim information than the insider. She can thus adjust early-and late-dying agents' consumption levels to the information on the return on the long-term asset as well as on the realized aggregate liquidity shock. Such responsiveness of allocations is in general beneficial for outsiders' welfare. Our comparisons across the two trading scenarios generate subtler and perhaps surprising conclusions. Often the outsiders' expected utility levels are higher in scenario (C), in which the insider may take part in the interim asset trading, as compared to scenario (B) in which outsiders carry out such trading among themselves. This outcome is more likely to arise when their adverse selection losses to the insider are lower, which happens for example when the lowest possible return on the risky technology rises, or when the variability in the aggregate liquidity demand of outsiders diminishes. This net beneficial impact of insider trading on outsiders is more likely to arise when the average proportion of agents requiring early consumption increases -provided it is not so large as to make trading by the insider unprofitable for her.
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The main beneficial impact of insider trading for outsiders, which compensates for the adverse selection losses incurred by them in trading, arises as follows. Since the insider does not sell 5 the long-term asset when its anticipated return is high, and if in addition the aggregate liquidity shock is low, the market price of the long-term asset fully reflects its high return. This enhances the consumption level of early-diers, subject to the liquid endowments of late-dier agents. This impact of insider trading on the outsider agents' consumption profiles is the dominant factor behind the possibility of outsiders' welfare improving with insider trading. 6 It arises without any interim flexibility in aggregate real investment choices, unlike in the models of Allen (1984) , Leland (1992) , and Dow and Rahi (1996) . However, outside investors are less likely to be better off with insider trading when the range of variation in the proportion of early-dying agents in the economy is greater, because the insider is thereby able to sell higher quantities of the long-term asset when its anticipated future return is low. 7 As a result the adverse selection losses arising from her sales to the late-dier outsiders, at a price that is not fully revealing of her information, increase.
Insider trading might also reduce outsiders' ex ante under-or over-investment in the long-term asset relative to its first-best level. This possibility is logically present in an incomplete-markets setting with agents subject to uninsured private liquidity shocks, in which interim traded allocations are generically ex ante inefficient (Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) ).
However, this effect does not appear to arise uniformly in our numerical simulations.
Our paper is set out as follows. In Section I, we describe the main features of our model, and the solution methods for it. Numerical comparisons of investment choices, asset prices and agents' welfare levels are carried out in Section II. In Section III we conclude.
I. ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATIONAL MECHANISMS
There are three time points t=0,1,2. All agents are born at t=0 and supply inelastically endowments of unity in aggregate. There is a continuum of agents with an aggregate Lebesgue measure of unity, and in addition, possibly an Insider with a strictly positive measure.
Endowments can be invested either in a risky technology paying off at t=2, or in a riskless storage technology paying off at t=1 and, if reinvested at t=1, at t=2. Holdings of the twoperiod risky technology can, however, be traded in a secondary market at t=1, with selling by agents who wish to consume early. The storage technology has unit gross returns and the risky technology with constant returns to scale has final payoffs per unit investment of θ distributed as: θ L with probability (1-π) θ = (1) θ H with probability (1-π) as viewed from the ex ante time point t=0, where θ H >1> θ L . It is assumed that π is common knowledge among all the agents and so is the expected return on the risky asset:
For convenience, we sometimes denote {π,(1-π)} as {π L , π H }.
The outside agents' intertemporal preferences for consumption, at t=1or at t=2, can be described as follows. There are two aggregate liquidity states l and h, and associated conditional probabilities 0<α l <α h <1, such that conditional on the aggregate state l(h), each agent's utility function for consumption at times t=1 and t=2 is an independently identically distributed random variable:
These aggregate liquidity states, l and h, are assumed to arise with ex ante probabilities q and (1-q), sometimes denoted {q l , q h }. We assume that {q, α l , α h } are common knowledge, but that each uninformed agent only knows her own realized U(C 1 ,C 2 ), but not the aggregate state l(h).
These ex ante random interim preferences, coupled with their aggregate variability, have effects on interim asset prices similar to those arising from "noise traders" in REE models.
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Agents make per capita real investment choices across the two technologies, the shortand the long-term, in proportions K and (1-K) respectively at t=0. Further net investment in, or liquidation of, the risky technology at the interim date t=1 is assumed to be infeasible.
However, individual agents who wish to consume at t=1, and those who wish to postpone their consumption until t=2, can anticipate trading their long-term investment in the risky technology at equilibrium prices P(K, θ j , α i ), j∈ {L,H}, i∈ {l,h}, per unit investment. Here, P(K, θ j , α i ) is the Rational Expectation Equilibrium price mapping from the underlying aggregate state, which includes the equilibrium investment choice K at t=0. This mapping must be measurable with respect to the information possessed by the collection of trading agents, possibly including the insider when she participates. The insider is assumed to have an exogenous endowment of the risky technology, from which she may choose to sell an amount and reinvest the proceeds in the short-term technology at the interim (t=1) date.
A. Ex Ante Optimal Allocations
The central planner, endowed with interim information about the future risky asset payoff and the aggregate liquidity state, would choose C t,ij and K to maximize:
subject to the resource constraints that, for each aggregate state (i,j) ∈{l,h}×{L,H}:
where the subscripts (i,j) refer to the states of liquidity, l (h), and of risky asset return, L (H).
B. Traded Equilibria Without Inside Information
The consumption levels of early-and late-diers are, respectively:
where X ij (P ij ) is the net amount of the long-term asset bought per unit of late-diers, at t=1. In an equilibrium without the insider trading, {P ij , X ij } can only depend on the liquidity state i.
Furthermore, we must have market clearing:
and since the late-diers wishing to consume only at t=2 have, in the aggregate, no agents to borrow from 9 , we must also have:
Equations (7a) and (7b) together imply the aggregate liquidity constraint on market-clearing prices:
In their ex ante choice of K, the representative agents maximize their ex ante expected utility:
(9) 9 whereas at t=1, given P i (which in equilibrium will only reveal state l or h to traders without private information about θ ), the "late diers" choose X i for I = {l, h}, in order to:
leading to a uniquely maximal X i (P i ) which, in the interim equilibrium represented by equation (7a) must also satisfy equation (7b), given the ex ante optimal choice of K that anticipates the equilibrium evolution of {X i , P i } at time t=1.
Using the first-order conditions for the maximization problem in equations (10) and equation (7a), we determine candidate interim equilibrium prices P i (K) for a given K. These are found from among the positive real roots of a non-linear equation in P i 10 , unless the noborrowing constraint (7b) binds, in which case the market price is derived from equality in equation (8). We then calculate the implied ex ante choice of K using the maximization program in equation (9) taking the interim prices and trades as being given by the earlier set of calculations, and iterate until convergence in K.
C. Noisy REE with Insider Trading and Market Orders
We now postulate that, in addition to the agents we have already modeled, there is an insider endowed at t=0 with n≥[α h -α l ] units of the long-term technology only, which she may sell at time t=1 and invest in the riskless technology. This insider only wishes to consume at time t=2, and she knows perfectly at t=1 the return θ j on the long-term asset. Solely for simplicity in computing her expected utility, which determines her decision to participate in the interim trading at t=1 or not, we assume that the insider is risk-neutral.
The outside late-diers' trades are now allowed to depend on the partitions of the aggregate state space, {α l, α h }×{θ L ,θ H }, that are revealed to them by the equilibrium prices with the insider trading. The outside agents take the market-clearing REE prices in these partitions as given parametrically, and the late-diers submit demand functions {X(P)} with domain restricted to these prices only; the early-diers supply their long-lived assets inelastically. The insider chooses her trading rule strategically to take these outsiders' behavior into account. We assume that the insider can submit market orders only, so that in effect she can condition her sales only on her realised information about θ , but not on the aggregate liquidity shock among non-insiders, {α i }. This assumption is consistent with the feature of our model that early-dier outsiders supply their long-term assets inelastically, and hence the insider can mimic their sales only via (many small) market orders. Since it is in the interest of the insider to "mask" her private information about θ , strategic trading by the insider will result in a noisy REE in which the following three partitions of the aggregate state space are revealed by equilibrium prices:
with the associated (weakly increasing) set of interim prices {P a ,P b ,P c } respectively. In such an equilibrium, the insider sells a quantity Q>0 of the risky asset in states {h,L} and {l,L}, and does not trade otherwise. In particular, we rule out any borrowing at t=1 by the insider from late-dier outsiders to buy the long-lived asset. Even if the insider were to possess some endowment of the short-term asset, it is easy to show that she could not profitably carry out both buying and selling at t=1, without revealing one of these trades through its impact on the market-clearing interim asset price. Hence, for simplicity, we focus on insider sales only. The insider's choice of Q is made subject to the knowledge that late-dier outsiders would now choose their net purchases per capita (per unit measure) of the risky asset X ij , in aggregate state {i,j}, to maximize their conditional expected utility:
where P ij is the noisy REE equilibrium price at t=1 in state {i,j} per unit of the risky technology, iĵ π is the outsiders' revised beliefs about θ , and X ij must satisfy:
X ij = X kl , i ≠k and/or j≠l, if P ij = P kl.
The outsiders' trades at t=1 must also satisfy a no-borrowing constraint:
Equivalently, taking market clearing into account, the REE prices must meet the aggregate liquidity constraint (where Q j equals Q for j=L, and 0 otherwise):
The revised beliefs } { ij π of outsiders depend, of course, on the partitions of the aggregate state space generated by the trading of themselves and the insider. Finally, the outsiders' ex ante investment is computed to maximize in equation (9), taking into account the {X ij ,P ij } configurations that would arise from such an ex ante K choice. Finally, in examining the existence of an equilibrium with Q>0 trades by the insider, we must compare her expected utility in such an equilibrium versus one in which --as in Section I.B above -she desists from trading, and thus one obtains an equilibrium in which prices are P 1 in states [{l,L} and {l,H}] , and P h ≤P l in states [{h,L} and {h,H}] . We are now in a position to describe fully the noisy REE arising with the informed insider trading.
PROPOSITION. If condition (16) below is satisfied, then there exists a noisy REE in which
the insider sells Q>0 in states {l,L} and {h,L} where Q satisfies:
where X(P b ) is the late-diers' per capita demand for trade in the risky technology in states [{l,L}and {h,H}] given equilibrium price P b therein, chosen to maximize in equation (12a) given their revised beliefs:
with the complementary conditional probability
. In the other states, equilibrium prices and beliefs satisfy:
in state {h,L} with ( ) a H P π =0, where X(P a ) maximizes in equation (12a) 
and, similarly,
Together, the outsiders' investment choice K and the interim equilibrium prices must satisfy the aggregate liquidity constraint (13). Finally, in order to satisfy the condition for profitability of this insider trading strategy we must have that, in equilibrium, given the ex ante optimal choice of K by non-insiders:
Remark 1: Violation of inequality (16) is possible since P a <θ L is feasible.
Remark 2: For simplicity, our insider is endowed only with the risky asset and can only sell it because any interim borrowing reveals her identity. If she also had some of the riskless asset, she would not buy the risky asset in state H and then sell it in state L via market orders, since then the equilibrium would be fully revealing and her profits would be driven to zero.
Remark 3:
As noted above, the insider would not send limit (i.e., price-contingent) orders that reveal her identity, given that the early-dier outsiders submit market orders.
The insider sells the risky asset when the risky asset payoff is low and does not trade otherwise. Since she masks her trades, the quantity sold by her depends on the range of variation in the proportion of early-dying agents, in such a way that late-diers do not know whether they are buying from early-diers or from the insider. However she cannot condition her orders on prices. It follows that the state {l,H} is revealed because the proportion of earlydiers is low and the insider has no incentive to sell. Similarly, the state {h,L} is revealed by the sales coming from the insider and also a high proportion of outsiders with liquidity needs.
II. NUMERICAL RESULTS ON INVESTMENTS, PRICES, AND WELFARE
The possibility of "corner solutions" vis-à-vis interim {X ij } trades appears to rule out a fully analytic solution for computing equilibria. Hence, even for our agents with additively separable power utilities, we have to resort to numerical calibrations 11 in order to compare equilibrium outcomes across alternative informational regimes. We seek to understand under what circumstances one would expect to see one trading regime to do better than another for the other agents' ex ante welfare levels. Such understanding is of importance in order to establish guidelines for desirable regulatory restrictions on insider trading which is ex-post detectable and adequately punishable.
We have computed equilibrium allocations for the grid of parameter values below: , with a relative risk aversion coefficient of three, though other U(C) were tried as well. We have taken n=1, i.e., an insider with at least equal shareholdings as that of non-insiders. However, it is only the equilibrium extent of selling of the risky technology in some states of nature at t=1 by the insider (Q>0) that has an impact on interim prices. Such trading is bounded above by the difference in the aggregate selling of the long-term asset by the early-dier outsiders across the states {l,L} and {h,H}, a difference which the insider "masks" via her trading.
From the comparisons in Table I , we see that: (1) insider trading is more likely to improve outsiders' welfare when θ L is high, and the extent to which it does so is greater when θ H goes up. However, as the gap {α h -α l } widens allowing the amount of insider selling Q to increase, equilibria with insider trading tend to become worse for outsiders than equilibria without such trading, owing to the adverse selection losses of the late-diers to the insider in the state {l,L}.
In Panel 1 of Table II, of Table II , we look at interim prices --in the two partitions {α l , α h } for trading scenario (B) and in the three partitions
Note that in the partition [α l ,θ H ] the equilibrium with insider trading often has the interim long-term asset price equaling θ H , which leads to consumption gains for early diers, that are beneficial for of the ex ante welfare of outsider agents. The interim traded outcome without the insider is ex ante inefficient in this respect.
We have also computed some welfare comparisons for lower and higher average level 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown, with an intertemporal model of individual as well as aggregate liquidity shocks to uninformed agents, that insider trading can improve outsiders' welfare, even when aggregate investment choices can not respond to any partial revelation of information brought about by such insider trading via prices. The rationale behind our finding is the beneficial impact of insider trading on outsiders' selling prices and consumption in some states, which more than compensates for their adverse selection losses in other states of nature.
When short-term traders sell their shares, informationally-efficient share prices lead to larger transfers from long-term traders to short-term traders when the future returns are high, and smaller transfers from long-term traders to short-term traders when the future returns are low.
As a result, insider trading improves risk-sharing among the outsiders, which can compensate for their adverse selection losses to her. We find these results to be interesting, because the impact of insider trading via prices on interim investment choices by a firm --an "alternative channel" for its beneficial effect --is artificial at best, when the same insiders choose the firm's investment policy.
A net beneficial impact of insider trading on outsiders' welfare, which we have documented, is particularly likely to arise when (1) the insider's equilibrium trades are small, relative to outsiders' liquidity-based trades, and (2) the riskiness (lower bound) of returns on the risky investment, about which the insider is privately informed at the interim date, is not too high (low). Otherwise, as is conventionally thought, insider trading is harmful to the outsiders' welfare, owing to the adverse selection losses to them arising from her trades.
Table I Ex Ante Optimal Expected Utilities of Outside Agents
This table shows the ex ante optimal expected utilities of outside agents. Section (A) reports values for the first best, while sections (B) and (C) portray the no-insider and the insider trading cases respectively. The θ j are the realized payoffs to the risky technology. The α i are the realized shares of early-diers among the outsiders. The range of variation for α i increases from Panel 1 (0.05) to Panel 3 (0.2). Cells have a dark frame when outsiders' welfare is higher with than without insider trading. Values are marked with * when the liquidity constraint is imposed in state lH, and with ^ when the liquidity constraint is imposed in states lH, lL and hH. In the shaded areas it does not pay the insider to trade and equilibrium values coincide with those in (B). 
